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Snider: Constitutional Law--Interstate Commerce--Injunctions Restraining
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

EDITORIAL NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE--INJUNCTIONS RESTRAINING INTERFERENCE THEREWITH .- The right

to strike, in the mining industry, has received a serious set
back if the United States Supreme Court sustains the decision of the district judge in the Pittsburgh Terminal Coal
Corporation Case. With what alarm that decision has been
received by labor unions and the press is manifest from
the following quotation:
"Through the decision, Pittsburgh Terminal CoaZ Corporationv. United Mine Workers of America, however, the
production of coal in this case is established as interstate
commerce within the terms of the Clayton Act, and the
acts of a labor union can be held to constitute a monopoly
in contravention of the Sherman anti-trust act. More
and more the courts are building up precedents for such
decisions and this reaching out by injunction is responsible for this growing attitude of distrust upon the part
of labor toward the courts, and actuated the recent warning by the American Federation -of Labor that there
should be hesitancy about placing in the hands of the
courts any greater powers." 1
The charge is made that in the above case the production
of coal is established as interstate commerce. It is a criminal offense to enter into a contract, combination, or cons:piracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states
or with foreign nations, or to monopolize or attempt to
monopolize or conspire to monopolize any part of such
trade.2 It has been laid down by the Supreme Court that
the mining of coal is not interstate commerce and the cons-piracy to obstruct the mining at particular mines, though
it may prevent coal from getting into interstate commerce,
is not a conspiracy to restrain that commerce unless an intention to restrain it be proved. 8 Can such intent be proved?
Is not the primary purpose-the direct object, benefit of the
labor members, rather than a malicious or even wilful desire or intent to interfere with interstate trade? Can the
PrIMBURGH PRESS, Thursday, October 18, 1927.
2

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Act July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209).
259 U. S. 344, 407 (1921).
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assumed jurisdiction be justified by decision? Or rather is
it not refuted by many pronouncements by the United States
Supreme Court on the subject? Negotiable instruments
are not instruments of commerce and buying and selling
futures in another state or sending apparel out of state to
4
be laundered and returned are not interstate commerce.
In the case of Kidd v. Pearson,5 the court said:
"No distinction is more popular to the common mind
or more clearly expressed in economic and political
literature than that between manufacture and commerce.
Manufacture is transformation-the fixing of raw materials into a change of form for use. The functions of
commerce are different. The buying and selling and the
transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce;
and the regulation of commerce in the constitutional
sense embraces a regulation at least of such transportation. The legal definition of the term, as given by this
court in the case of County of Mobile v. Kimball, is as follows: 'Commerce with foreign countries and among the
states, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and
traffic, including in these terms navigation, and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as
the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.' If it
be held that the term includes the regulation of all such
manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to
deny that it would also include all productive industries
that contemplate the same thing. The result would be
that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the
state, with the power to regulate, not only manufactures
but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic
fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human industry, for is there one of them that does not contemplate,
more or less clearly, an interstate or foreign market?
* * ** * The power being vested in Congress and denied
to the states, it would follow as an inevitable result that
the duty would devolve upon Congress to regulate all
these delicate, multiform, and vital interests-interests
which in their nature are and must be local in all the
detail of all their successful management."
It was held that the Child Labor Law cannot be sustained
on the theory that Congress has power to control interstate
commerce in the shipment of child-made goods because of
the effect of such goods in states where the evil of child
'

Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 (1900).
128 U. S. 1 at 20 (1888).
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labor has been more vigorously restrained than in the state
of production. 6 Neither was Congress able to control child
1
labor by the imposition of a tax.
The American Sugar Refining Company by acquisition of
certain refineries was controlling the output of ninety-eight
percent of the sugar in the United States. A suit was instituted under the Sherman Act after the acquisition of certain refineries in Pennsylvania. The court held that the
transaction had only to do with the acquisition of property
within a state and was not prohibited by the Sherman Act.
The argument was that the power to control the manufacture of refined sugar is a monopoly over a necessary of life
to the enjoyment of which by a large part -ofthe population
of the United States interstate commerce is indispensable
and therefore the Government, in the exercise of its power
to regulate commerce, may repress such monopoly directly
or set aside the instruments which have created it. But the
court distinguishes the power to control the manufacture of
a given thing and the power to control its distribution. The
court says:
"Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part
of it. The power to regulate commerce is a power to
prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed
and is a power independent of the power to suppress
monopoly, but it may operate in repression of monopoly
whenever that comes within the rules by which commerce is governed or whenever the transaction itself is
a monopoly of. commerce." 8
The manufacture of paper is not commerce though paper
may become the subject of commerce.
The mining of ore
even though when mined the ore is immediately and continuously loaded on cars and shipped into states to satisfy existing contracts is not interstate commerce and is subject to
local taxation. 10
There seems to be no question and the courts will yield no
dissent to the proposition that a combination, conspiracy, or
agreement between independent manufacturers and prod ucers of a necessary of life, to fix and maintain uniform
6 Hammer

v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 261 (1817).
7 Bealy v. Drexel Drug Co., 269 U. S. 20 (1921).
- U. S. V. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).

. Mass. Paper Co. ". U. S.,246 U. S. 135 (1917).
,oOliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 112 (1922).
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prices for their productions or otherwise to suppress competition with each other is an unlawful restraint upon such
trade." However, it will be found that combinations in restraint and monopoly of trade within a single state to affect
commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act must
have for their purpose an effect that is not accidental, secondary, remote, or merely probable. 1 2 Thus where the subject matter of the combination was manufacture, even
though the direct object was monopoly of manufacture, the
end was not a necessary or primary consequence. 1 3 Yet the
court speaking of the contracts and agreements for the purpose of controlling prices to be paid for cattle at stock
yards says that their effect upon commerce among the states
is not accidental, secondary, remote, or probable. There the
subject matter was sales and the very point of the combination was to restrain and monopolize commerce among
the states in respect of such sales. It will be noted
that the emphasis is placed upon the words direct object of
the contracts and agreements entered into.
In other cases the direct object of attack was interstate
commerce. Where, for example, members of a trade union
attempted to enforce a boycott against a manufacturer of
hats, 14 and a combination of retail dealers attempted by an
agreement among them to blacklist or boycott wholesalers
engaged in interstate retail trade in lumber. 15 In another
case the question was whether a state could tax a business
of a broker dealing in contracts for the future delivery of
cotton where there was no obligation to ship from one state
to another.'
The tax was sustained and dealing in cotton
futures was held to be not interstate commerce. But where
the defendants conspired to gain control of the available
supply of cotton and enhance the prices in all markets of
the country, it was held to be a conspiracy to restrain interstate trade as such control would directly and materially
impede and burden the due course of trade among the states
which the anti-trust act was designed to prevent. 7 It will
U.

it U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895) ; Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. V.
S., 175 U. S. 211 (1899) ; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
12 U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., aupra.
11 Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
1, Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1907).

1' Eastern States Retail Lumber Assn. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 600 (1914).
" Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405 (1907).
17 U. S. v. Patten. 226 U. S. 525 (1913).
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be noted in this case that the direct object of the conspiracy
is within the category intended to be restrained by the act.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft has said:
"Coal mining is not interstate commerce, and obstruction of coal mining though it may prevent coal from going into interstate commerce is not a restraint of that
commerce unless the obstruction to mining is intended to
restrain commerce in it or has necessarily such a direct,
material and substantial effect to restrain it that the
intent reasonably must be inferred."' 8
The circumstances that a car loaded with coal and billed to
another state was held to have no significance upon the
head that there was a conspiracy in restraint of commerce.
If five thousand tons of coal a week is not such a tonnage
that its withdrawal from interstate trade would furnish a
basis of itself for inferring an intent to restrain interstate
trade, but five thousand tons a. day is such a tonnage that
its withdrawal from interstate trade is evidence from which
an intent can be inferred on the part of the union to restrain
interstate commerce, can it not be argued that a producer
who habitually ships five thousand tons of coal per day in
interstate commerce would be just as guilty of violating the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act by stopping the mines and withdrawing such a tonnage from trade as the United Mine
Workers by means of a strike? In other words, if the intent to restrain interstate commerce is to be inferred from
the quantity of coal withdrawn by a strike, is it not just as
reasonable to infer that a large corporation has a like intent
when it shuts down its mines for what to it is good and sufficient cause? If it were assumed that several persons combined to impair or destroy a factory or mine at which commodities were produced that go into interstate commerce
that fact alone would not support a finding of a combination or conspiracy. The fundamental question in defining
the scope of the commerce clause is whether the conduct
sought to be regulated has direct or indirect relation to
interstate commerce. To hold that an injury to a mine
merely producing coal which, if produced and sold would
enter into interstate commerce, or a closing of the mine, is
interference with interstate commerce, is to ignore the dis2 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 844, 410 (1921).
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tinction which underlies the interpretation of the commerce
clause. 19
It is elementary that before the United States courts
have jurisdiction, where there is no diversity of citizenship,
a federal question must be presented for determination.
Not merely alleging the existence of such -a question will
suffice to give the court jurisdiction. There must be a real
substantive question. Nor can jurisdiction be inferred argumentatively from the pleadings.2 0 Assuming that the
plaintiff is owner of and engaged in operating coal mines
located within one state whose available output of coal
under normal conditions is approxirhately seventeen thousand tons daily, eighty-three percent of which is habitually
and regularly shipped in interstate commerce; and assuming that the United Mine Workers of America being entirely cognizant of these facts, determined on and caused a
strike in concert of all the plaintiff's mines; and assuming
that the Executive Committee of the United Mine Workers
and all its members generally have been and are now engaged in an effort to unionize the mines -of this particular
district for the effect such unionization will have upon the
competitive field composed of states surrounding said district; and assuming further that said United Mine Workers
know that such strike will prevent and they intend such
strike to prevent the shipment of coal from the plaintiff's
mines in interstate commerce, and that they know and intend that such withdrawal of coal from interstate commerce
will enhance the price of coal produced by the competitive
field around said district, can it be said that the direct
and primary purpose of such strike is to interfere with interstate commerce to the extent of conferring jurisdiction on
the federal court, no diversity of citizenship appearing on
the record? Must not the United Mine Workers interfere
with the shipment of coal in transit or with it after arrival
at its destination rather than interfere with the local operation of coal mines before such interference with interstate
commerce can be said to be within the meaning of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act? Is not this distinction made by
the court in holding that the interference with the manu"1 U. S. v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525
(1918) . Hopkins v. U. S. 171 U. S. 578 (1898);
Delaware, etc. Ry. Co. v. Ukronis, 238 U. S. 489 (1915).
1 Hanford v. Davies, 168 U. S. 278 (1896) ; Hall v. Burr, 284 U. S. 712 (1914).
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facture of trunks and leather goods was not of itself an interference with interstate commerce, even though its effect
might be to curtail the shipment of the manufactured product in interstate commerce ?21
In the second Coronado Coal Company Case, the court,
through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, says:
"The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be
shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious
prevention of its manufacture or its production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce, but when the intention of those unlawfully engaged in the manufacture or production is shown to be to
restrain or to control the supply entering and moving in
interstate commerce or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the anti-trust act."
* * * * "We think there was substantial evidence tending to show that the purpose of the destruction of the
mines was to stop non-union coal and to prevent its shipment to other states than Arkansas where it would be
competition tending to reduce the price of the commodity and check injurious maintenance
of wages for union
22
labor in competing mines.1
The above language is seized upon as the basis of the
decision by the district judge. It is submitted that it is
both too general and predicated upon a premise, the assumption of which is necessary to give the court jurisdiction.
Therefore it is not a proper compass to steer us safely across
an uncharted and suspectedly treacherous sea.
The difference between the weight of ordinary evidence
produced at trial in a suit for damages, and ex parte affidavits in support of a petition for a restraining order should
not be lost sight of. The court may be justified in inferring
a wrongful intent when it hears and weighs all the evidence
in a case, or may even by intuition decide that such wrongful intent was the motivating cause. Yet the court should
not lay itself open to criticism of unfairness by drawing
from ex parte affidavits inferences of wrongful intent.
Where intent is a necessary element of crime it must be
exactly alleged and conclusively proved. No less strict
rule should be countenanced in equity cases where issues of
fact as of law are tried by a single judge without a jury.
United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (1924).
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925).
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There is too much danger from injunctions like that in the
Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Company Case that in this vast
struggle of forces lying beneath social unrest the power of
the state can justly be said to have been thrown on the side
of capital.
-CLIFFORD

R.

SNIDER.

THE CHANGING LAW OF COMPETITION IN PUBLIC SERVICEA DISSENT.-The principles outlined by Mr. Hardman in his
very able article in this issue of the West Virginia Law
Quarterly, and in his former article under the same title
in the last volume of this Quarterly have attracted interest
which is not confined to this state. Mr. Hardman is among
the first to analyze the decisions illustrating what he terms a
new judicial legal principle, i.e., a principle of regulated
monopoly in public service with a view to the protection of
existing public utilities against ruinous competition. By
this he means that courts should recognize that the paramount intent of the public in having good service at adequate rates is better served by protecting existing utilities
against free competition.
The question of whether there is or whether there should
be such a new legal principle in public utilities law is one
which has attracted wide interest and even anxiety. The
editors of the Quarterly have received letters and inquiries
from various parts of the United States. Companies operating bus lines and companies manufacturing busses are
anxious to know what this new legal principle is and what
its results will be. Such companies have vital economic
interests in the question. They are able to keep in touch
with legislatures and usually have, or at any rate think
they have, an idea of what legislative acts mean. They
also have, or think they have, means of persuading legislatures to repeal acts if they are economically unsound. The
announcement of a new judicial principle dealing with
public utilities however leaves them in a state of perplexed
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